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THE CAPITAL DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO MAKE
A PERSONAL PLEA FOR MERCY:
COMMON LAW ALLOCUTION
AND CONSTITUTIONAL MITIGATION
By J. THOMAS SULLIVAN*
Criminal defense lawyers recognize that their ability to personalize the
capital defendant in a death penalty trial is of critical importance in
avoiding the death penalty. The defendant's appearance and testimony
before the sentencing jury or judge often plays the most significant role
in securing a favorable sentencing verdict.' Defense counsel endeavor to
present the accused as an individual capable of feeling and expressing
remorse and of demonstrating some measure of hope for the future in
making their plea for a sentence alternative to death. These strategies
may offset the strong evidence which is characteristic of many death
penalty prosecutions. In many instances, however, counsel advises the
accused not to testify. Counsel attempts to avoid disclosure of the de-
fendant's prior criminal record because the record may have an adverse
impact on jurors deciding whether to impose the death penalty.
2
This Article proposes that a capital murder defendant, once convicted
and facing the possibility of his jury imposing a death sentence, must
have an unencumbered right to make a personal plea for leniency. The
"right" to make a plea for mercy arises from the concept of allocution-
the right of the accused to speak in his own behalf prior to pronouncement
*B.A., University of Texas; J.D., Southern Methodist University; LL.M., University of Texas.
Director, Appellate Clinic, Southern Methodist University School of Law; formerly, Appellate De-
fender, New Mexico Public Defender Department.
The approach advocated in this article was successfully used in State v. Simonson, 100 N.M.
297, 669 P.2d 1092 (1983), by trial attorneys with the New Mexico Public Defender Department's
Albuquerque trial office: former District Defender Bruce Kelly, Albert "Pat" Murdoch, and Norm
St. Landau. The trial judge, the Honorable A. Joseph Alarid, now a judge of the New Mexico Court
of Appeals, granted defense counsel's motion to afford the accused an opportunity to make his
personal statement to the jury. Defendant Simonson was sentenced to life imprisonment and no issue
regarding his allocutory statement was litigated on appeal. The author wishes to thank Rosemary
Mendonca, Administrative Secretary, and Annabelle Sandoval, Secretary, Appellate Division, New
Mexico Public Defender Department for their assistance in preparing this manuscript.
1. Balske, New Strategies for the Defense of Capital Cases, 13 Akron L. Rev. 331, 356-57 (1979).
See Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 299 (1983).
2. See Weaver v. United States, 408 F.2d 1269 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 927 (1969);
J. Weinstein, Evidence, § 609[3] (1982) and cases and materials therein cited; Note, To Take the
Stand or Not to Take the Stand: The Dilemma of the Defendant With a Criminal Record, 4 Colum.
J.L. & Soc. Probs. 215 (1968).
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of sentence by the trial judge 3-and the constitutional requirement that
a capital sentencing procedure permit the accused to offer mitigating
evidence.4 The right to speak without threat of disclosing otherwise un-
disclosed information such as a prior record may prove valuable, or
decisive, to a capital defendant seeking to avoid the death penalty.
Currently, evidentiary rules permit the prosecution to impeach a de-
fendant making a personal plea with his prior record of conviction or of
criminal activity generally.' These rules restrict the accused's direct com-
munication with the jury or judge.6 In contrast to the situation in which
the defendant testifies, as that term is traditionally understood, the de-
fendant's personal plea for leniency or mercy in a capital case does not
justify impeachment with his prior criminal record. The constitutional
guarantees of the right of due process,7 the right of the accused to present
a defense,' and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment,9
3. See generally Barrett, Allocution, 9 Mo. L. Rev. 115, 232 (1944) (discussing history of
allocution and alternative approaches among American jurisdictions; criticizing the right under Mis-
souri law as a technical formality, the absence of which does not prejudice the accused).
The American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice § 18-6.4 recommends that sen-
tencing proceedings should "afford to the defendant his or her right of allocution .... " In State v.
Nicoletti, - R.I. -_, 471 A.2d 613 (1984), the court reversed defendant's judgment and sentence
where the trial court failed to afford defendant an opportunity to address the court prior to sentencing,
based on article I, section 10, of the Rhode Island Constitution. See also Koteles v. State, 660 P.2d
1199, 1200 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); State v. Fettis, 136 Ariz. 58, -, 664 P.2d 208, 209 (1983)
(en banc); State v. Goodrich, 97 Idaho 472, 546 P.2d 1180 (1976); In re Stevens, 144 Vt. 250, 478
A.2d 212 (1984) (all recognizing right of allocution).
The value of the right is illustrated by State v. Brinkley, 681 P.2d 351 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
The defendant had been sentenced for a sexual offense without benefit of allocution and the case
was remanded for a new sentencing proceeding. Thereupon, the accused's challenge of the judge
was sustained based on his prior sentencing decision and another judge was appointed to conduct
the sentencing hearing. The second proceeding and change of judge resulted in defendant receiving
a lesser sentence than previously imposed. Id. at 352, 354.
4. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). "We . . . conclude that the eighth and fourteenth
amendments require that the sentencer . . . not be precluded from considering as a mitigatingfactor,
any aspect of the defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that
the defense proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." Id: at 604 (emphasis in original).
See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
In People v. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d 41, 479 N.Y.S.2d 706, 468 N.E.2d 879 (1984), the New York
Court of Appeals held that a mandatory death penalty statute applicable to murders committed by
inmates serving indeterminate term sentences of 15 years to life violated the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the eighth amendment that the sentencing authority be permitted to consider all
relevant mitigating circumstances in setting punishment. See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying
text.
5. N.M.R. Evid. 404(b), 609.
6. The Washington Supreme Court, in State v. Jones, 101 Wash. 2d 113, 677 P.2d 131 (1984)
(en banc), observed: "[The admission of a defendant's witness' prior convictions may well adversely
affect that defendant's decision to take the stand. . . . The defendant's fears are well-founded." Id.
at -, 677 P.2d at 136 (citation omitted).
7. U.S. Const. amend. V provides, in pertinent part: "No person shall be... deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "
8. U.S. Const. amend. VI provides, in pertinent part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
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also militate against the prosecution's use of prior convictions or criminal
activity to impeach a testifying defendant whose statement consists merely
of a plea for leniency.'"
In order to assess the claimed validity of this right, this Article examines
three different aspects of sentencing procedure: the New Mexico approach
to capital sentencing, compared with other major approaches; the con-
stitutional requirement that a capital sentencing proceeding permit the
accused to offer evidence in mitigation of punishment; and the common
law right of allocution. It then examines the proposed plea for mercy and
the chilling effect of impeachment of a defendant pleading for mercy.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF CAPITAL SENTENCING PROCEDURES
In response to decisions of the United States Supreme Court limiting
the use of capital punishment as a sentencing option in murder cases,"
states have adopted varied approaches to capital sentencing. 2 These var-
trial, by an impartial jury ... to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel
for his defense.
9. U.S. Const. amend. VIII provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
10. The author premises this position on the notion of a "super due process" demanded by the
courts in death penalty cases. See Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due
Process for Death, 53 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1143 (1980); see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978),
and Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978) (reversing death penalty statutes which failed to provide
defendants adequately with constitutionally required opportunity to demonstrate mitigating circum-
stances justifying imposition of life sentences, rather than death).
11. The Supreme Court struck down existing death penalty laws in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972). Subsequent efforts to enact mandatory death sentences for murder were declared un-
constitutional in Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976), and Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280 (1976). Other attempts to enact constitutionally acceptable death penalty statutes were
deemed successful in a trio of cases which proved to be a cornerstone in the resuscitation of capital
punishment. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976),
and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). Ohio's statute was subsequently ruled too limited in terms
of the accused's right to present mitigating evidence. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Bell
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978). The court also struck down Georgia's inclusion of rape as a capital
offense in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
12. The recent history of the New Mexico death penalty statute is illustrative. Prior to the landmark
decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-29-2 (1953) provided
that the jury's recommendation that the accused be sentenced to life imprisonment would prohibit
a trial judge from imposing the death sentence upon conviction for a capital felony. Similarly, the
accused would avoid death by entering a plea of guilty to the capital offense charged. Following
Furman, the legislature repealed this provision, adopting a mandatory death penalty scheme for all
adults convicted of capital offenses. N.M. Stat. Ann. §40A-29-2 (1953). Under both schemes,
capital felonies subject to punishment by death were limited by § 4OA-29-2. I to murder of a police
officer or jail guard while in the performance of his duties or to commission of a second capital
felony after time for due deliberation following commission of an initial capital offense. The New
Mexico Supreme Court upheld the mandatory sentencing approach in Sena v. Hodges, 89 N.M.
351, 552 P.2d 787 (1976).
Within weeks after Serna v. Hodges, the court reversed itself in light of the intervening United
States Supreme Court decision in Woodson v. North Carolina., 428 U.S. 280 (1976). State v.
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iations affect the assessment of the legal merits of the personal plea for
mercy. For the most part, the major approaches all require the sentencing
authority to consider the facts surrounding the offense as a primary basis
for determining punishment and then require a consideration of the ac-
cused as a second factor.'3
Rondeau, 89 N.M. 408, 553 P.2d 688 (1976). The Rondeau court voided the mandatory punishment
provision in light of the Woodson holding. Id. at 411-12, 553 P.2d at 691-92. The Rondeau court
held that capital punishment is not cruel and unusual, but concluded that the mandatory scheme
adopted by the legislature violated federal constitutional precepts. Id. at 412-13, 553 P.2d at 692-
93. See also State v. Rumsey, 267 S.C. 236, 226 S.E.2d 894 (1976) (voiding South Carolina's
mandatory death penalty statute and relied on by the court in Rondeau).
Following the approval of capital punishment statutes not relying on mandatory death penalty
provisions, the legislature enacted the current statute, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§31-20A-1 to -6 (Repl.
Pamp. 1981), which survived constitutional attack in the New Mexico Supreme Court in State v.
Garcia, 99 N.M. 771, 664 P.2d 969, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2464 (1983).
Other states also have enacted capital punishment statutes in the wake of the 1976 rejection of
arguments that the death penalty per se violates the eighth amendment:
Alabama: Ala. Code § 13A-5-49 (1982)
Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703 (Supp. 1982)
Arkansas: Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1303 (1977)
California: Cal. Penal Code § 190.1 (West 1983)
Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-103 (Cum. Supp. 1984)
Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-46a (West 1981)
Delaware: Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §4209 (Supp. 1982)
Florida: Fla. Stat. Ann. §921.141 (West 1981)
Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. § 17-10-30 (1982)
Idaho: Idaho Code § 19-2515 (1979)
Illinois: I11. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 9-1 (Smith-Hurd 1979)
Indiana: Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9 (Bums 1979)
Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. § 532.025 (Supp. 1982)
Louisiana: La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 905 (West. 1983)
Maryland: Md. Code Ann. art. 27, §413 (Repl. Pamp. 1982)
Massachusetts: Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 279, § 69 (Michie/Law Co-op. 1983)
Mississippi: Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-1 (Supp. 1982)
Missouri: Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.012 (Supp. 1982)
Montana: Mont. Code Ann. §46-18-301 (1982)
Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2523 (1979)
Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.033 (1981)
New Hampshire: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 630:5 (Supp. 1981)
New Jersey: N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:11-3 (West 1978)
New York: N.Y. Penal Law § 125-27 (McKinney 1975)
North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2000 (Supp. 1981)
Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.02 (Page 1982)
Oklahoma: Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, §701 (West Supp. 1982)
Pennsylvania: 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9711 (1982)
South Carolina: S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20 (Law. Co-op. 1982)
South Dakota: S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 23A-27A-l (Supp. 1981)
Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-203 (1982)
Texas: Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. § 37.071 (Vernon 1965)
Utah: Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201 (1981)
Vermont: Vt. Stat. Ann. § 2303 (Supp. 1982)
Virginia: Va. Code § 19.2-264 (Supp. 1982)
Washington: Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.95.070 (Supp. 1983)
Wyoming: Wyo. Stat. §64-101 (Supp. 1982)
13. The constitutional requirement imposed by Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976),
is that the sentencing decision focus on the "circumstances of the offense together with the character
and propensities of the offender." Id. at 304. The approach is designed to insure that capital defendants
are viewed as "uniquely individual human beings." Id.
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A. The Circumstances of the Offense
The Supreme Court developed the primary basis-the circumstances
of the offense-in decisions requiring the states to limit application of
the death penalty to offenses for which the penalty is constitutionally
appropriate. 4 Thus, in Godfrey v. Georgia,5 the Court suggested that
the overly broad categorization of all murders as demonstrating a cal-
loused disregard for human life (and, therefore, as warranting the death
penalty) could run afoul of constitutional limitations. 16 Similarly, in Coker
v. Georgia, 7 the Court rejected application of capital punishment as
appropriate for the offense of rape. The Court essentially held capital
punishment inappropriate for any state offense except murder. 8
All capital murder statutes use definitional characteristics to distinguish
murders punishable by death. 9 For instance, the Texas statute defines
certain circumstances as elements of capital murder;2° the statute cate-
gorizes capital murder as an offense distinct from first degree murder.
Other states incorporate capital murder in their uniform definitions of first
degree murder, but provide that the death penalty may be applied if the
offense is committed under statutorily enumerated "aggravating circum-
stances. ,2 Typically, the alternative theories of capital murder under the
14. Currently, no state statute imposes death for any offense except murder. The federal death
penalty for espionage authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 794(a)(1982) recently was declared unconstitutional
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. United States v. Harper, 729 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1984).
15. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
16. In Godfrey, the Court reviewed a death sentence imposed under the aggravating circumstance
requiring that the murder was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman." Id. at 442.
The Court held that, under the facts of the case, this standard did not properly distinguish capital
from non-capital murders, as constitutionally required.
17. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
18. Id. at 592. See Radin, supra note 10, at 1145 n.6. Rape has, however, traditionally played
an important factor in death penalty legislation and in the number of executions. In Smith v.
Commonwealth, 319 Va. 455, 248 S.E.2d 135 (1978), the Virginia Supreme Court reviewed de-
fendant's sentence of death for capital murder committed in the course of committing rape and noted
that "of the 236 persons actually executed in the last seven decades, 232 had been convicted of
murder or rape or murder in connection with rape." Id. at __, 248 S. E. 2d at 151.
19. For example, N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-2-1 (1978) defines all first degree murders as "capital
felonies" in New Mexico. The death sentence may only be imposed if the first degree murder is
committed under one of the categories of "aggravating circumstances" set forth in N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 31-20A-5 (Repl. Pamp. 1981). These generally include: 1) murder of a police officer; 2) murder
during commission or attempted commission of kidnapping, criminal sexual penetration, or criminal
sexual contact with a minor; 3) murder during escape from a New Mexico penal institution; 4)
murder by an inmate of an inmate; 5) murder of an employee of the corrections department by an
inmate; 6) murder for hire; and 7) murder of a witness to prevent report of a crime or in retaliation
for testimony previously given.
20. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03 (Vernon 1974). These categories include: 1) murder of a law
enforcement officer or fireman; 2) murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit
kidnapping, burglary, robbery, aggravated rape, or arson; 3) murder for hire or promise of remu-
neration; and 4) murder committed during escape or attempted escape from a penal institution. The
Texas statute defines the capital form of the offense by reference to these five categories and to
murder as defined by Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(a)(1): "A person commits an offense if he ...
intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual .... "
21. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. §§30-2-1, 31-20A-5 (1978 and Repl. Pamp. 1981). The "ag-
gravating circumstances" approach was approved by the Supreme Court in Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242 (1976), and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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Texas statute" and the enumerated aggravating circumstances of other
statutes23 address the same offenses: murders committed for hire;24 mur-
ders involving law enforcement 25 or prison personnel;26 or murders com-
mitted to facilitate or in the course of committing other felony offenses.27
The statutory definition given those offenses which state legislatures
deem appropriate for punishment by death forms the primary limit upon
the imposition of capital punishment. 28 The Supreme Court, however,
precluded states from imposing death uniformly on all persons convicted
of such offenses, holding that mandatory death penalty schemes violate
the eighth amendment protection against the arbitrary imposition of capital
punishment.29 Instead, the Court, in striking down mandatory death pen-
alty statutes, effectively required the states to develop approaches that
provide for individualized determinations on the appropriateness of the
death penalty.3"
22. Supra note 20.
23. E.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20A-5 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
24. Id. § 31-20A-5(F).
25. Id. §31-20A-5(A).
26. Id. § 31-20A-5(E) (murder of prison employee). See State v. Garcia, 99 N.M. 771, 664 P.2d
969, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2464 (1983), and N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20A-5(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1981)
(murder of inmate by inmate). See also State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 369, 670 P.2d 463, 470
(1983) (upholding sentence of death for defendant convicted of murdering another inmate of the
Idaho State Penitentiary).
27. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20A-5(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1981) defines murders committed during com-
mission of kidnapping, criminal sexual penetration, and criminal sexual contact of a minor as
aggravating circumstances. See State v. Finnell, - N.M. -, 688 P.2d 769 (1984); State v.
Guzman, 100 N.M. 756, 676 P.2d 1321 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3548 (1984); State v.
Cheadle, 101 N.M. 282, 681 P.2d 708 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1930 (1984). Section 31-
20A-5(C) defines murder committed during attempted escape from a penal institution, also a felony
under New Mexico law, as an aggravating circumstance. These aggravating circumstances may
reflect traditional felony-murder notions or may suggest a greater degree of culpability.
Under the New Mexico murder statute, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-1-2 (1978), a felony murder con-
viction would appear to support a sentence of death if committed under a statutorily enumerated
aggravating circumstance. But c.f. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 624-25 (1978) (White, J.,
concurring) (questioning the constitutionality of imposing death for a killer who did not intend to
kill). See also Radin, supra note 10, at 1161 n.64 (discussing appropriateness of death sentence in
such instances).
28. For example, although some state legislatures have included armed robbery as a felony
constituting the basis for finding murder committed during commission of a felony, the New Mexico
legislature has not done so. But consider State v. Finnell, - N.M. -, 688 P.2d 769 (1984), and
State v. Cheadle, 101 N.M. 282, 681 P.2d 708 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1930 (1984), in
which robbery situations have been prosecuted based on the aggravating circumstance of the murder
of a witness under N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20A-5(G) (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
29. Mandatory death penalty statutes have been deemed cruel as to some convicted murderers.
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); State
v. Rondeau, 89 N.M. 408, 553 P.2d 688 (1976).
30. The possibility of imposition of different punishments for the same offense, based on the
circumstances of the offense and the offender, was expressly approved by the Court in Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), with the observation that mandatory sentencing "treats all
persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings, but as members
of a faceless, undifferentiated mass .... "Id. at 304.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals rejected an attack on the mandatory term of imprisonment
imposed by the New Mexico Legislature for all non-capital, first degree felonies which was based
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B. Consideration of the Offender
Once the prosecution establishes that the murder fits within the ambit
of the death penalty statute, the sentencing authority then considers the
accused personally as a factor in the sentencing process." In this con-
sideration, the sentencing authority must review and assess the mitigating
effect of any evidence offered by the accused or present in the state's
case-in-chief. The three approaches to capital sentencing discussed below32
differ in the ways in which the sentencing authority considers the cir-
cumstances of the offense and the accused in arriving at the decision to
impose the death penalty or a sentence of life imprisonment.
1. Aggravating Circumstances as a Threshold Inquiry
The first approach to capital sentencing is illustrated by the Georgia
capital punishment statute.33 The Georgia statute utilizes the allegations
of "aggravating circumstances" as a threshold in the sentencing deci-
sion. 4 Those murders which are not committed under one of the statutory
aggravating circumstances cannot be punished by death.35 Once the state
establishes that the threshhold inquiry has been met, the sentencing au-
thority proceeds to consider the circumstances of the offense, together
with evidence offered in mitigation, in deciding whether death should be
imposed.
2. Aggravating Circumstances Weighed Against Mitigating
Circumstances
The second approach, adopted by New Mexico
36 and other states, 37
requires the sentencing authority to weigh aggravating circumstances against
mitigating circumstances raised by the evidence in deciding on the sen-
tence. The states which have adopted this second approach essentially
use the aggravating circumstances concept not only as a threshold for
classifying murders into death sentence and non-death sentence cases,
on the argument that this mandatory sentencing scheme violates the sentencing principle expressed
in Woodson. State v. Garcia, 100 N.M. 120, 126-27, 666 P.2d 1267, 1273 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
100 N.M. 192, 668 P.2d 308 (1983).
31. The Woodson Court held that the eighth amendment "requires consideration of the character
and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the offense as a constitutionally
indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death." 428 U.S. at 304.
32. See infra notes 33-49 and accompanying text.
33. Ga. Code Ann. § 17-10-30 (1982); see also Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983)
(examining Georgia capital sentencing scheme).
34. Zant, 103 S. Ct. at 2744.
35. Ga. Code Ann. § 17-10-31 (1982).
36. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20A-2(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1981) provides, in pertinent part: "After weigh-
ing the aggravating circumstances and the mitigating circumstances, weighing them against each
other, and considering both the defendant and the crime, the jury or judge shall determine whether
the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment."
37. E.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1302(l) (1977); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2000(b) (Supp. 1981);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-203(9) (1982); Wyo. Stat. § 6-4-102(d)(1) (Supp. 1982).
Winter 1985]
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but also as factors which the sentencer must consider in making the
punishment decision."
The weighing process adopted by New Mexico requires the jury to
weigh the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circum-
stances. 3 9 The state must meet the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the aggravating
circumstances.' A failure of proof on this point results in imposition of
a life sentence, because the applicable Uniform Jury Instruction, adopted
by the New Mexico Supreme Court to implement the statute, precludes
a verdict of death in such case."' This is, however, the limited extent of
38. As the Court noted in Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983), death sentences have been
set aside in states using the "weighing" approach when a statutory aggravating circumstance relied
on for conviction and imposition of the death sentence has been declared unconstitutional. Id. at
2741 n.12. See Williams v. State, 274 Ark. 9, -, 621 S.W.2d 686, 687 (1981); State v. Irwin,
304 N.C. 93,-__, 282 S.E.2d 439,448-49 (1981); State v. Moore, 614 S.W.2d 348, 351-52 (Tenn.
1981); Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 90, 171-72 (Wyo. 1981).
39. N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-20A-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1981); N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 39.33. (Repl. Pamp.
1982). This uniform jury instruction required the sentencing jury to deliberate as follows:
If you have unanimously agreed on a finding that [the aggravating circumstance
charged was] [one or more of the aggravating circumstances charged were] present,
you must then consider the penalty imposed in this case. In determining the
penalty to be imposed, you must consider all of the evidence admitted during the
sentencing proceeding and the evidence admitted during the trial in which the
defendant was found guilty of murder, you must then consider whether there are
any mitigating circumstances.
If you find there are mitigating circumstances, you must then weigh the mitigating
circumstances against [the aggravating circumstance] [one or more aggravating
circumstances] you found in this case. After weighing the aggravating circum-
stances and the mitigating circumstances, weighing them against each other, and
considering both the defendant and the crime, you shall determine whether the
defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment....
The supreme court amended this instruction, effective October 1, 1984, and renumbered the
instruction as N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 39.34. (Cum. Supp. 1984). This instruction now provides:
If you find any aggravating circumstance(s) that [was][were] charged you must
weigh [that][those] aggravating circumstance(s) against any mitigation circum-
stances, [one or more aggravating circumstances]' you have found in this case.
After weighing the aggravating circumstances and the mitigating circumstances,
weighing them against each other, and considering both the defendant and the
crime, you shall determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death
or life imprisonment. The aggravating circumstance(s) must outweigh the miti-
gating circumstances before the death penalty can be imposed.
However, even if the aggravating circumstance(s) outweigh the mitigating cir-
cumstances, you may still set the penalty at life imprisonment.
The supplement does not include a Use Note, as the footnote would indicate, and the phrase
bracketed and footnoted does not make sense in the context of the sentence.
40. N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 39.31 (Repl. Pamp. 1982), now renumbered as N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 39.30
(Cum. Supp. 1984), provides in pertinent part: "[The burden is always on the state to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the murder was committed under one or more of the aggravating circumstances
charged and that the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the aggravating circumstances... "
41. Id. However, the other jury instructions relevant to this point, N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 39.32,
39.33 (Repl. Pamp. 1982), do not expressly address the jury's duty in the event the aggravating
circumstances are outweighed by the mitigating circumstances or in the event the state fails to
discharge its burden of showing, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the mitigating circumstances
outweigh the aggravating circumstances.
Reviewing the instructions as a whole, this problem may arguably be solved by the jury's strict
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the burden of proof placed upon the state because the applicable instruc-
tions do not require the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
death is the appropriate punishment.42
3. The Potential for Future Violent Behavior
The third approach, adopted by the Texas Legislature, never requires
the jury to reach a sentencing verdict. Instead, the jury considers at least
two, and possibly three, special issues. The first special issue requires
the jury to make a finding on the culpability the actor demonstrated in
committing the offense, a requirement suggesting that a greater degree
of criminal intent is required for a capital than non-capital murder.43 The
second special issue focuses the jury's attention on the likelihood that
the defendant will commit additional acts of criminal violence in the
future." The third special inquiry, given only if the evidence raises the
issue, relates to provocation.45 Unanimous affirmative answers to the
special issues requires imposition of the death sentence.'
In contrast to those statutory schemes which rely upon aggravating
circumstances as a factor to be weighed in the sentencing process, the
reference to N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 39.30 (Cum. Supp. 1984). N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 39.33 (Repl. Pamp.
1982) formerly provided, in pertinent part: "If you fail to unanimously agree that the death penalty
should be imposed, a penalty of life imprisonment will be imposed by the court .. " However,
in the amended instructions, the New Mexico Supreme Court has deleted this language explaining
that a non-unanimious verdict will result in a life sentence. Moreover, the supreme court appears to
have precluded a non-unanimous verdict being returned by the jury. N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 39.37, which
sets forth the applicable verdict forms, provides only for a unanimous sentencing verdict. This
approach violates the legislative intent of the statute, which clearly affords the defendant the benefit
of a non-unanimous sentencing decision with a life sentence.
42. N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 39.30 (Cum. Supp. 1984) (quoted in part, supra note 40).
43. This reading is based on the requirement that the jury find a "deliberate" act, which is not
required for proof of non-capital first degree murder. Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. art. 37.071
(Vernon 1965) provides:
(b) On conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the court shall submit the
following issues to the jury:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased
was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the
death of the deceased or another would result....
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held in King v. State, 553 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. Crim. App.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1088 (1978), that there is no requirement that the trial court define
"deliberately" in its instructions to the jury.
44. Subsection (b)(2) of article 37.071 provides that the jury be questioned on "whether there is
a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society .... "Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. art. 37.071 (Vernon 1965).
The court in King v. State, 553 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1088 (1978), held that the terms "probability," "criminal acts of violence," and "continuing threat
to society" did not require further definition. This section has generated considerable litigation,
particularly based on the use of psychiatric testimony for expert prediction on the probability that
the accused will commit further acts of criminal violence. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383
(1983); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). Cf. Idaho Code § 19-2515(0(8) (1979).
45. Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. art. 37.071(b)(3) requires the jury to inquire "whether the
conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation,
if any, by the deceased" if the question is raised by the evidence.
46. Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. art. 37.071(e) (Vernon 1965).
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second issue posed under the Texas approach appears to be limited to the
accused's prospects for rehabilitation.47 It does not appear to open the
door to an offer of mitigating evidence because, technically, the court
charges the jury to return an affirmative answer if the state proves that
the accused will probably commit acts of criminal violence in the future."
Explanation of or justification for the potential for violent behavior would
not enter into the jury's finding unless the jurors deviated from strict
consideration of the express intent of the special issue.49
C. Evidence of a Prior Criminal Record
In assessing the differing approaches to sentencing decisions, an im-
portant consideration in recognizing a capital defendant's right to make
a plea for mercy lies in the potential usage of the defendant's prior criminal
record in the sentencing process, particularly when the defendant elects
to have the jury set punishment. If the state cannot affirmatively offer the
record as a fact for the sentencing authority to consider, then it is important
that the accused have an opportunity to address the jury without threat
of exposing himself to impeachment through the use of his prior record.
Otherwise, the accused would seldom chance the prejudice resulting from
disclosure of the prior record in return for his opportunity to speak in
open court. The New Mexico approach to capital sentencing does prohibit
affirmative use of the prior record, making the plea for mercy a potentially
valuable right.5"
Under the Texas scheme, by contrast, the prior record of the defendant
is both material and relevant for the jury's consideration of the probability
that the accused will commit acts of criminal violence in the future.5
Thus, irrespective of whether the defendant testifies, the state may offer
the prior record affirmatively, provided that the trial court limits the jury's
use of the record to those aspects of the prior record which truly reflect
a propensity for violent criminal behavior.52 Moreover, the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals has held that the state is not restricted to offering
proof of felony convictions or convictions for violent offenses;-" instead,
47. The requirement that the future acts of violence be "criminal" and that the accused pose a
"continuing threat to society," see supra note 44, suggests non-amenability to rehabilitative tech-
niques.
48. Nevertheless, even absent a consideration of mitigating factors, the Supreme Court held the
Texas death penalty sentencing procedure constitutional in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 269 (1976).
49. See Benson, Texas Capital Sentencing Procedures after Eddings: Some Questions Regarding
Constitutional Validity. 23 So. Tex. L.J. 315 (1982).
50. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-20A-5 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
51. Roney v. State, 632 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
52. E.g., King v. State, 657 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). In King, the court reversed
the defendant's death sentence, noting that the state had failed to show that prior burglaries introduced
in the punishment stage involved personal violence.
53. In this sense, punishment evidence appears to follow both the theories of admissibility rec-




the court has deemed the facts of offenses committed,54 charged,55 or
resulting in conviction56 relevant to the jury's assessment.
Some states have adopted as a statutory aggravating circumstance the
existence of a prior record of criminal activity.57 The state may prove the
facts underlying the prior record in meeting its burden of proof concerning
the circumstance. The New Mexico statute, in contrast, provides that a
defendant may rely upon the absence of a prior record of serious crime
as a statutory mitigating circumstance.5" Of course, if a defendant in-
correctly attempts to rely on this mitigating circumstance, the state would
probably be entitled to offer conflicting evidence to prove the existence
of the prior record.59 The trial court, upon defendant's motion, should
determine this matter outside the presence of the jury, and assuming the
evidence does not support the claimed mitigating circumstance, not in-
struct the jury on this point.'
54. Williams v. State, 622 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1008
(1982) (evidence of unadjudicated, extraneous rapes properly admitted); Rumbaugh v. State, 629
S.W.2d 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); contra State v. Bartholomew, 98 Wash. 2d 173, 654 P.2d
1170 (1982); opinion on remand, 101 Wash. 2d 631, 683 P.2d 1079 (1984). The Bartholomew court
held unconstitutional Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.060(3) (Supp. 1983), which authorized admission
of evidence of prior, unadjudicated criminal conduct in capital sentencing proceedings. The court
relied on state constitutional grounds in "declin(ing) to suspend in a capital case protections afforded
all other criminal defendants." 101 Wash. 2d at - , 683 P.2d at 1086.
55. Thus, where the defendant's confession included admission of other offenses, admission of
the confession was deemed proper. Hamett v. State, 578 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979),
petition dismissed, 448 U.S. 725 (1980). Similarly, the court held that there was no error in admitting
the indictment from a prior murder conviction, even though an indictment is generally not considered
evidence. Bravo v. State, 627 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). In Green v. State, 587 S.W.2d
167 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), the court held that no error was committed in proving that the accused
had committed another, similar murder one month after commission of the offense for which he was
being tried.
56. Davis v. State, 597 S.W.2d 358 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 976 (1980).
57. Examples of the different approaches adopted by other states are: Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(5)(b)
(West 1981) (prior conviction for violent felony); Idaho Code § 19-2515(f)(1) (1979) (prior murder
conviction); Ind. Code Ann. §35-50-2-9(b)(7),(8) (Bums 1979) (prior murder conviction or proof
of murder without conviction); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 532.025(2)(a)(1) (Supp. 1984) (prior convictions
with substantial history of assaultive convictions); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.012-2(1) (Supp. 1982)
(substantial prior record); and Va. Code § 19.2-264.2 (Supp. 1982) (prohibiting imposition of death
penalty unless prior criminal record demonstrated and future possibility of repetition of crime shown).
58. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20A-6(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1981); N.M. U.J.1. Crim. 39.33 (Cum. Supp.
1984). Many state statutes incorporate absence of a significant prior record or history of criminal
activity as a statutory mitigating circumstance. See supra note 12 (citing state capital punishment
statutes).
59. In such a case, the use of prior convictions would be appropriate not only to test the accused's
credibility, but to demonstrate the inaccuracy of the testimony as to the "facts" regarding the accused's
prior record. In State v. Maynard, 311 N.C. 1, 316 S.E.2d 197 (1984), the North Carolina court
held that, where the defendant in the course of the capital sentencing proceeding testified that he
had never been in trouble before, the door was opened to admission of two unrelated convictions
in rebuttal.
60. Where the defense intends to assert lack of significant prior criminal activity and the issue
is in doubt due to potentially conflicting evidence, particularly with regard to the interpretation to
be given "significant" in this context, defense counsel should move to resolve the issue prior to
trial.
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Nevertheless, under the New Mexico statutory scheme, the prosecution
cannot affirmatively use a prior record because the statute expressly limits
the jury's consideration of aggravating circumstances to those set out in
the statute.6 ' Thus, under no circumstance could a properly instructed
jury consider the accused's prior record for any purposes except: 1) to
impeach a testifying defendant;62 or 2) to evaluate the claimed mitigating
factor of lack of a prior record of serious criminal activity.63 The potential
use of the prior record for impeachment, however, can chill the defend-
ant's desire to make a personal statement to the jury because of his
legitimate concern that disclosure of a prior record will influence the
sentencer adversely.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRESENT
MITIGATING EVIDENCE
Because the concept of the personal statement or plea for mercy relates
directly to a defensive strategy for avoiding the imposition of a sentence
of death, it is closely allied with the general concept of mitigation as it
applies in death penalty prosecutions.
In its landmark decision in Furman v. Georgia,' the Supreme Court
invalidated existing death penalty statutes. The Court's plurality opinion
focused on the arbitrary application of the penalty.65 Rejecting the notion
that the Court had absolutely held the death penalty constitutionally in-
valid, many states responded to Furman by enacting mandatory death
penalty statutes which would apply the punishment uniformly to all per-
sons convicted of committing certain categories of murder.'t These states,
61. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20A-5 (Repl. Pamp. 1981) provides in pertinent part: "The aggravating
circumstances to be considered by the sentencing court orjury.., are limited to the following.
(Emphasis added.)
62. See infra Section V and accompanying notes (discussing impeachment with prior convictions).
63. In enacting § 31-20A-5, the legislature had the benefit of comparison to numerous state statutes
in which prior criminal record is designated as a statutory aggravating circumstance. See supra note
57. Instead, the legislature expressly limited the aggravating circumstances set out in the statute,
avoiding the problem of unconstitutional vagueness in the wording of the aggravating circumstance,
such as that leading to the Georgia court's decision in Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 224 S.E.2d
386 (1976), holding this aggravating circumstance unconstitutional in part.
64. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
65. The Furman majority split in its opposition to existing capital punishment statutes. Justice
Douglas took the position that the death penalty had been discriminatorily applied and, thus, resulted
in an unfair application of the punishment. 408 U.S. at 256-57. Justices Brennan and Marshall
concluded that the death penalty was no longer constitutionally permissible based on their perceptions
that evolving standards of decency precluded its use. Id. at 282. Justice Stewart voted with the
plurality based on his conclusion that the death penalty was being arbitrarily or unfairly applied.
Justice White, however, held the view that mandatory punishment would obviate the problem of
"freakish" application of the death penalty which exists when only a relatively few murderers are
sentenced to die. Id. at 310-14.
66. Louisiana, North Carolina, New Mexico (N.M. Stat. Ann. §40A-29-2 (Supp. 1975)), North
Carolina, and Louisiana enacted mandatory death penalty statutory schemes. These statutes were
voided on constitutional grounds. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North
[Vol. 15
COMMON LAW ALLOCUTION
relying on Justice White's concurring opinion in Furman,67 intended these
statutes to prevent arbitrary application of capital punishment. Justice
White had concluded that the source of the eighth amendment violation
discerned by the plurality was attributable to the infrequency of appli-
cation of the death penalty, which rendered execution an unlikely con-
sequence of capital murder or rape.' Arguably, then, mandatory capital
punishment cures the constitutional defect because it avoids an arbitrary
application of the death penalty by treating all murderers within the capital
class equally.
The mandatory sentencing approach fell, however, as the Court sub-
sequently voided a series of state statutes.' The Court struck down the
statutes because, under mandatory sentencing, no individual could prove
himself deserving of a lesser sentence, despite evidence of an otherwise
productive, peaceful life or of a strong indication of rehabilitation po-
tential.70 Thus, in Lockett v. Ohio,7 the Court ruled that states must afford
an accused facing the death penalty the opportunity to present evidence
supporting a lesser sentence." The Court reaffirmed this principle in
Eddings v. Oklahoma." It ruled that the sentencing authority in a death
penalty case must consider individual factors in the accused's life which
either would explain or excuse, in part, the behavior exhibited in the
commission of the capital offense.
The factors the Eddings Court discussed are available as mitigating
factors under the New Mexico sentencing scheme.74 In New Mexico, the
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); State v. Rondeau, 89 N.M. 408, 553 P.2d 688 (1976). See also
Hudson v. McAdory, 268 So.2d 916 (Miss. 1972) (Mississippi Supreme Court construed Furman
to require mandatory sentencing for death penalty offenses); State v. Rumsey, 267 S.C. 236, 226
S.E.2d 894 (1976) (holding South Carolina's mandatory death penalty statute unconstitutional).
67. 408 U.S. at 311 (White, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 312-14. See also Justice White's separate opinion in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978): "I greatly fear that the effect of the Court's decision today will be to constitutionally compel
a restoration of the state of affairs at the time Furman was decided ... when the death penalty was
generally reserved for those very few for whom society has least consideration." Id. at 623.
69. See supra note 66.
70. In Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), the Court held that mandatory sentencing
was constitutionally defective in failing to allow the particularized consideration of relevant aspects
of the character and record of each convicted defendant before the imposition upon him of a sentence
of death. Id. at 303.
71. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
72. Id. at 606-09; see Comment, Washington v. Strickland: Defining Effective Assistance of
Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1544 (1983).
73. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
74. The factors noted in Eddings as critical elements in mitigation are set out in N.M. U.J.I.
Crim. 39.33 (Cum. Supp. 1984), which provides in pertinent part:
You must also consider circumstances of the offense together with the character,
emotional history and family history of the defendant and any other circumstances
which you find to be mitigating.
This portion of the instruction is to be given, in whole or in part, as part of the general instruction
on mitigation only if requested by the defendant. See Use Note 3. Formerly, this language had been
incorporated in N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 39.30 (Rep..Pamp. 1982) and would not have been subject to
tailoring to the evidence offered in individual cases at the discretion of the defense.
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sentencer must consider statutory and non-statutory mitigating circum-
stances in the weighing process." The accused in a New Mexico pros-
ecution, therefore, is entitled to wide discretion in presenting mitigating
evidence. This evidence falls generally into two broad categories: (1) the
accused may rely on those factors which affirmatively demonstrate some
character trait or prior activity which merit the jury's favorable consid-
eration;76 and (2) the accused may rely on those factors which may help
to explain his behavior, such as a lack of capacity77 or subjection to some
influence limiting his freedom of decision.7" The Eddings-type factors
fall within the second category, as factors suggesting that the murder was
in some sense a product of an unfavorable environment or circumstance
essentially beyond the actor's control.
New Mexico has adopted an approach to mitigating factors which
emphasizes the defense's right in the sentencing phase to counter the
facts of the offense with evidence which might be immaterial in any other
first degree prosecution. This type of evidence might prove admissible
in other felony sentencing proceedings,79 but limitations on judicial dis-
cretion in sentencing for non-capital, first degree offenses practically
restrict the major thrust of such sentencing arguments to lesser offenses.8 °
Of course, a trial court may rely on mitigating evidence in ordering
sentences to be served concurrently, rather than consecutively, after con-
viction on multiple count offenses or upon multiple convictions."
75. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20A-6 (Repl. Pamp. 1981). But, in State v. Guzman, 100 N.M. 756,
676 P.2d 1321 (1984), the court held that the trial court had properly excluded the testimony of two
experts who would have testified that, in their opinions, the defendant should not be sentenced to
death because of his mental impairment. While testimony concerning the defendant's emotional and
mental condition was properly before the jury, the court ruled that expert opinion on the suitability
of death as a punishment would have essentially invaded the province of the jury. Id. at 763, 676
P.2d at 1328.
76. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20A-6 (Repl. Pamp. 1981) provides, for instance, that the following
factors are recognized as mitigating: the absence of a significant history of prior criminal activity;
the likelihood that the defendant can be rehabilitated; the fact that the defendant cooperated with
authorities; and the defendant's age.
77. Id. (e.g., subsections (C) (defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was impaired); (D) (the defendant was
under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance); and (F) (the defendant acted under circum-
stances which tended to justify, excuse, or reduce the crime)).
78. Id. In particular, subsection (B) identifies, as a mitigating circumstance: the defendant acted
under duress or under the domination of another person.
79. See infra Section III and accompanying notes (discussing allocution).
80. However, the trial court is still afforded discretion to consider evidence at sentencing in either
increasing or decreasing the mandatory sentence by one-third. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-21 (1978).
See also State v. Mead, 100 N.M. 498, 672 P.2d 1129 (1983), reversing 100 N.M. 23, 665 P.2d
289 (Ct. App. 1983)(supreme court reversed court of appeals holding statutorily authorized aggra-
vation of sentences unconstitutional due to inadequate guidelines for exercise of trial court's dis-
cretion).
81. Cumulation orders are generally committed to the discretion of the trial court. However,
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-21 (1978) requires cumulation of punishment for sentences imposed upon
conviction for offenses committed by inmates or while at large under a deferred or suspended sentence
or while on probation or parole.
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The New Mexico statute, however, does not provide that the sentencing
authority may only impose the death sentence upon a showing that death
is the only appropriate sentence in the case.82 Although a New Mexico
court cannot impose death unless the state shows that the mitigating
circumstances do not outweigh the aggravating circumstances beyond a
reasonable doubt, 3 no burden of proof requires the state to show that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances beyond
a reasonable doubt." This lack of a statutorily imposed burden of proof
has been challenged,85 based at least in part on a split among other state
jurisdictions concerning the need to impose an affirmative burden of proof
on the state in the sentencing process."
The negative burden of proof demonstrates the importance of presenting
mitigating evidence in the punishment phase of a death penalty trial.
Because capital offenses often are not particularly difficult prosecutions
in terms of evidence or theories of the offense, defense counsel frequently
direct their entire energies at trial toward the sentencing phase in an effort
to gain a life sentence.87 Absent a truly contested case on the issue of
82. Thus, a jury might impose death based on its perception of the need to remove the accused
from society when, in fact, a less restrictive means of achieving this goal--life imprisonment-
might be satisfactory. This situation suggests a problem of constitutional dimension. Cf. Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 921.141 (1981) (requiring the sentencing judge to impose a sentence of death only if it is
an appropriate penalty in light of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances).
83. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20A-4 (Repl. Pamp. 1981) provides, in pertinent part: "C. The death
penalty shall not be imposed if ... the evidence supports a finding that the mitigating circumstances
outweigh the aggravating circumstances. N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 39.31 (Repl. Pamp. 1982) pro-
vided, in pertinent part:
The burden is always on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
murder was committed under one or more of the aggravating circumstances charged
and that the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the aggravating circum-
stances.
(Emphasis added.) In amending this instruction, now N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 39.34 (Cum. Supp. 1984),
the supreme court added important language to direct the jury:
However, even if the aggravating circumstance(s) outweigh the mitigating cir-
cumstances, you may still set the penalty at life imprisonment.
Id.
84. N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 39.33 (Repl. Pamp. 1982) only requires that the jury weigh the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances against each other without imposing any burden of proof which the
state must meet in order to show that the sentence of death is appropriate. The instruction does
provide, however, that the death penalty cannot be imposed if the mitigating circumstances outweigh
the aggravating circumstances.
85. In State v. Finnell, - N.M. -. , 688 P.2d 769 (1984), the court held that the proof "beyond
a reasonable doubt" standard was not applicable to decisions to impose death under the New Mexico
statute. Cf. Ybarra v. State, - Nev. - , 679 P.2d 797 (1984) (Nevada Supreme Court declined
to reverse or vacate a sentence of death where the aggravating and mitigating circumstances evidence
was deemed equal).
86. Compare State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1982) (holding that burden upon state in capital
sentencing proceeding is to show death appropriate in the case beyond a reasonable doubt), with
State v. Bolder, 635 S.W.2d 673,683-84 (Mo. 1982) (not requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt
standard for finding that death is appropriate punishment).
87. N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-21-I0A (Cum. Supp. 1984) authorizes parole for an inmate serving a
life sentence as a result of conviction for a capital offense upon completion of thirty years of his
sentence.
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guilt or innocence, the right to present mitigating evidence is singularly
important in death penalty cases.
III. THE RIGHT OF ALLOCUTION
Avoidance of the death penalty may largely rest on the jury's perception
of the character and personal history of the defendant. Thus, an important
aspect of the right to present mitigating evidence lies in the defense's
ability to present the defendant to the jury in human terms. Often, the
defense succeeds by affording the defendant the opportunity to address
the jury and offer personal reasons why it should impose a life sentence,
rather than death. This type of address is traditionally reflected in the
right of allocution.
Our jurisprudence has long recognized the right of the prisoner to speak
in his own behalf at the time of sentencing."8 Black's Law Dictionary
defines allocution, or allocutus, as:
Formality of court's inquiry of prisoner as to whether he has any
legal cause to show why judgment should not be pronounced against
him on verdict of conviction.8 9
This common law definition stresses the legality of exercise of jurisdiction
as the basis of allocution,9" rather than the right to present evidence in
mitigation of punishment. The former suggests a jurisdictional impedi-
ment to imposition of sentence, while the latter focuses upon the court's
discretion in setting the punishment. One commentator, for example, in
discussing the significant stages of the criminal process at which the
accused's incompetence may affect the power of the court to exercise
jurisdiction, notes that one of the five critical stages is "the time of
allocution, for he [the accused] must not be required to answer whether
he knows of any reason why judgment should not be pronounced against
him if he is incapable of understanding the question. . . ."" While the
common law may have strictly limited the doctrine to the right of the
accused to interpose any legal bar to pronouncement and execution of
88. See Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301 (1961). Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority,
noted: "As early as 1689, it was recognized that the court's failure to ask the defendant if he had
anything to say before sentence was imposed required reversal." Id. at 304.
89. Black's Law Dictionary 70 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
90. In this context allocution reflects the same legal concern as a motion in arrest of judgment.
See, e.g., Tex. Code Crim. Proc., art. 41.01 (Vernon 1965): "A motion in arrest of judgment is an
oral or written suggestion to the court on the part of defendant that judgment has not been legally
rendered against him. The record must show the grounds of the motion."
91. J. Perkins, Criminal Law 854 (2d ed. 1969).
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sentence, allocution has evolved as a legal concept relating to the ac-
cused's right to make a personal plea for mitigation of punishment.92
As applied in capital cases, the right of allocution afforded a capital
defendant forced to proceed without the benefit of counsel the opportunity
to express any reason why the court should not pronounce sentence after
conviction." New Mexico recognized the right as essential in capital
cases in Territory v. Herrera." In State v. Jones,95 the New Mexico
Supreme Court limited the right of allocation to capital cases.96 The court
subsequently extended the right of the defendant to speak before sen-
tencing to all sentencing proceedings, capital or non-capital, in Tomlinson
v. State.7' There, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the legislature
had extended the common law right of allocution to non-capital pro-
92. Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301 (1961). "None of these modem innovations [right to
testify, right to counsel] lessens the need for the defendant, personally to have the opportunity to
present to the court his plea in mitigation." Id. at 304.
The right of allocution is frequently a statutory-based right in American jurisdictions. E.g., Izzard
v. State, 663 S.W.2d 192, 195 (Ark. Ct. App. 1984) (no violation of right of allocution extended
by Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2303 (1977) where accused opted not to make statement); People v. Gistover,
131 Mich. App. 313, 345 N.W.2d 703, 704 (1984) (holding trial court sufficiently complied with
statutory directive to afford accused allocution); but see Bowles v. State, 168 Ga. App. 763, 310
S.E.2d 250, 253 (1983) (no statutory right of allocution in misdemeanor sentencing procedure).
Allocution is recognized as a defendant's right in federal prosecutions, see United States v. Cuevas-
Ramirez, 733 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1984), and has been construed-or misconstrued-as the right of
the government to present a sentencing argument as well. See United States v. Santarelli, 729 F.2d
1388 (11th Cir. 1984) (applying Fed. R. Crim. P. 32); Brown v. United States, 474 A.2d 161, 164
(D.C. App. 1984) (applying D.C. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 32).
93. Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 118 (1891); Fielden v. People, 128 Ill. 595, 21 N.E. 584
(1889). In reviewing the capital sentencing process in a pre-Furman decision, the Supreme Court
observed:
Appellant was found guilty after a fairly conducted trial. His sentence followed
a hearing conducted by the judge. Upon the judge's inquiry as to why sentence
should not be imposed, the defendant made statements. His counsel made extended
arguments. The case went to the highest court in the state, and that court had
power to reverse for abuse of discretion or legal error in the imposition of the
sentence. That court affirmed. We hold that appellant was not denied due process
of law.
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 252 (1949) (emphasis added).
94. 11 N.M. 129, 66 P. 523 (1901); accord United States v. Sena, 15 N.M. 187, 106 P. 383
(1909). In State v. Ybarra, 24 N.M. 413, 174 P. 212 (1918), the court held that, where the trial
court did not afford the defendant his right to speak upon conviction for a capital offense, the proper
disposition was to remand the cause to the trial court to permit the defendant to make his plea. See
also State v. Nicoletti, - R.I. __, 471 A.2d 613 (1984); Smith v. State, 257 Ark. 781, 520
S.W.2d 301 (1975) (both reversing for failure to afford accused right of allocution).
For an interesting decision involving a capital sentencing procedure, including the role of allo-
cution, see State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, -, 670 P.2d 463, 513 (1983) (opinion of Bistline,
J., on denial of petition for rehearing).
95. 34 N.M. 499, 285 P. 501 (1930).
96. Id.
97. 98 N.M. 213, 647 P.2d 415 (1982).
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ceedings by enacting section 31-18-15.1, which provides: "A. The Court
shall hold a sentencing hearing to determine if mitigating or aggravating
circumstances exist and take whatever evidence or statements it deems
will aid it in reaching a decision ... "'
The Tomlinson court inferred that the legislature was aware of the
doctrine in enacting the statute and construed "shall" as mandatorily
requiring a sentencing hearing," including the right of the accused to
speak in his own behalf"° in every felony sentencing proceeding. The
court also concluded, significantly, that failure to permit the defendant
to speak prior to sentencing could not be deemed harmless error. "'
In so holding, the court relied on the language of the Alaska and
Colorado Supreme Courts in their consideration of the same question. In
Mohn v. State, 2 the Alaska court noted: "[Tlhere is no substitute for
the impact on sentencing which a defendant's own words might have if
he chooses to make a statement. '"03 The Colorado court advanced a
similar expression:
A defendant must be notified when sentence will be pronounced, and
has a right to be present in the court with legal counsel at that time.
He has a right of allocution before sentence is handed down which
cannot be withheld from him. Failure of the court to properly insure
these rights of a defendant renders invalid a sentence pronounced
under those circumstances."°
98. The Tomlinson court construed the language of N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-18-15.1 (1978) to
require the trial court to hold a sentencing hearing in every case, relying on the traditional construction
of "shall" as mandatory unless contrary to the legislative intent expressed in the statute. See Security
Trust v. Smith, 93 N.M. 35, 37, 596 P.2d 248, 250 (1979).
99. The court observed that the Maryland court had similarly construed "shall" as mandatory
and that the applicable Maryland rule required allocutus in every sentencing hearing. Wright v. State,
24 Md. App. 309, 330 A.2d 482 (1975); accord Erickson v. City and County of Denver, 179 Colo.
412, 500 P.2d 1183 (1972).
100. Tomlinson, 98 N.M. at 215. "(Ihe trial judge must give the defendant an opportunity to
speak before he pronounces sentence." (Emphasis in original.)
101. Id. In response to the state's argument that the defendant in Tomlinson was afforded an
opportunity to speak after imposition of sentence, the court characterized this as an "empty gesture."
The court relied on State ex rel. Kahn v. Tahash, 274 Minn. 567, 144 N.W.2d 262 (1966). See also
Sellman v. State, 47 Md. 510, 423 A.2d 974 (1981) (trial court denied defendant's request to speak
prior to imposition of sentence; appellate court reversed and remanded for resentencing, noting that
the trial court could lessen defendant's sentence after hearing him speak); State v. Nicoletti, -
R.I. -, 471 A.2d 613 (1984) (the Rhode Island Supreme Court observed: "The fact that the trial
justice had a presentence report before him and afforded thedefendant the opportunity to speak after
the pronouncement is not sufficient.
102. 584 P.2d 40 (Alaska 1978).
103. Id. at 44.
104. People v. Emig, 117 Colo. 174, -, 493 P.2d 368, 369-70 (1972). But see Tenon v. State,
563 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (trial court's failure to inquire of defendant concerning,
any reason why sentence should not be pronounced did not require reversal).
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Extending New Mexico case law on the application of the right, the
court of appeals, in State v. Case,"0 5 held that an accused convicted of
criminal contempt of court has a right of allocution prior to sentencing. 06
Similarly, the defendant may speak prior to imposition of sentence in
federal prosecutions as a matter of statutory right."07 In United States v.
Behrens,lO the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in imposing
sentence in the absence of the defendant and his counsel. The Court
pointed out that the right of the defendant to "make a statement to the
judge in his own behalf is of most importance" and characterized the
right as "ancient in the law."'"
Although Tomlinson affirmed that the right of allocution extends to all
felony sentencing proceedings, the New Mexico Supreme Court has yet
to define the proper role of allocution in capital sentencing proceedings. ,"0
The court must clearly define that role in future decisions because death
penalty sentencing proceedings differ from other felony sentencing hear-
ings. Currently, allocution is limited to the right to make a statement prior
to the formal imposition of the sentence by the trial judge; it has yet to
be formally extended to encompass the right to make a personal statement
to the jury prior to the time that the jury retires to deliberate on sentencing.
Reserving the right of allocution to address the trial court before formal
pronouncement of sentence clearly fails to accomplish the goal intended
by the court in Tomlinson, "' because the court has interpreted the statute
to deny the trial court power to alter a jury-imposed sentence. "' In State
v. Guzman, 3 the defendant contended that the supreme court should give
105. 100 N.M. 173, 667 P.2d 978 (Ct. App. 1983).
106. Id. at 178, 667 P.2d at 983. Case follows Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974), in which
the United States Supreme Court, reviewing the law of criminal contempt, observed that even in
summary proceedings the trial court must afford the contemnor the opportunity to speak in his own
behalf in the nature of allocution before the court imposes sentence. Id. at 498. See also Ex parte
Avila, 659 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (en banc) (the court, following Taylor, upheld ruling
holding attorney in contempt of court for failure to appear for trial setting).
107. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(a)(l)(c).
108. 375 U.S. 162 (1963).
109. Id. at 165.
110. The issue was not raised in any one of the first four New Mexico post-Eddings death penalty
decisions to date: State v. Cheadle, 101 N.M. 282, 681 P.2d 708 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
1930 (1984); State v. Guzman, 100 N.M. 756, 676 P.2d 1321, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3548 (1984);
State v. Gilbert, 100 N.M. 392, 671 P.2d 640 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1429 (1984); State
v. Garcia, 99 N.M. 771, 664 P.2d 969, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2464 (1983).
Ill. 98 N.M. at 215, 647 P.2d at 417. The reason is that reserving the right to speak until
imposition of sentence would be too late in the proceedings to permit jury consideration of the
accused's statement prior to its deliberations on punishment; the "right" would prove to be the
"empty gesture" condemned by the Tomlinson court.
112. Id. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-20A-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
113. 100 N.M. 756, 676 P.2d 1321 (1984).
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effect to the trial court's finding on the record, contrary to the jury's
conclusion, that the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating
circumstances. The supreme court rejected the argument on the ground
that the statute precluded the trial court from imposing any punishment
other than that which the sentencing jury set after its deliberations." 4 If
the court were to limit allocution in the capital context to legal objection
to the imposition of sentence, then the right would appear meaningless
in light of the limitation plated upon the trial court to alter the jury's
judgment.
Tomlinson holds, however, that allocution is not limited to the assertion
of legal bars to the imposition of a sentence. Instead, it provides the
accused an opportunity to participate in the sentencing process by making
a personal plea for mitigation of punishment." 5 Because the jury, at the
option of the accused, 6 may set punishment in New Mexico death penalty
prosecutions, the logic of Tomlinson and its historical review of the right
in New Mexico jurisprudence establish that the right of allocution entitles
the defendant to make his personal statement or plea to the jury which
will decide his fate. The jury bases its decision on a weighing of the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances proved in the case" 7 and con-
siders the defendant and the crime in making its decision," 8 yet always
retains authority to impose a life sentence despite the results of the weigh-
ing process. "9 Thus, New Mexico law appears to require that the accused
be allowed to make some type of personal statement or plea to the jury
which will decide whether he will be sentenced to death."'2 This require-
ment is necessary if the right of allocution is to be meaningfully applied
in capital sentencing proceedings.
IV. THE PLEA FOR MERCY OR PERSONAL STATEMENT
OF THE CAPITAL DEFENDANT
The plea for mercy or personal statement arises from the right of
allocution and the constitutional right of the accused to offer mitigating
evidence in a capital sentencing proceeding. Once the accused elects to
have the jury set his punishment, his plea should be made to the jury
prior to its deliberations and not to the trial court, which merely pro-
114. Id. at 763, 676 P.2d at 1328.
115. 98 N.M. at 215, 647 P.2d at 417.
116. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20A-IB (Repl. Pamp. 1981). The defendant may elect to be sentenced
by the court but in no instance known to the author has a defendant accused of a capital offense
elected to have his punishment assessed by the trial court.
117. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20A-2(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1981); N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 39.33 (Repl. Pamp.
1982), amended and renumbered as N.M. UJI. Crim. 39.34 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
118. Id.
119. N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 39.34 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
120. See supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text.
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nounces sentence after the jury returns the verdict. The plea will likely
prove an important factor in the jury's evaluation of the accused and
appropriateness of capital punishment in his case.
The New Mexico Constitution provides, in pertinent parr:
All persons are born equally free, and have certain natural, inherent
and inalienable rights, among which are the rights of enjoying and
defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting
property, and of seeking and obtaining safety and happiness."'
This provision should be construed to provide that a capital defendant
has every legitimate means available for "defending life and liberty,"
including the right to address his sentencer personally.122 The severity of
the death penalty and the unequivocal nature of the right guaranteed by
the constitution suggest that the state cannot seek the death penalty without
affording the defendant an opportunity to plead for mercy without fear
of reprisal by disclosure of his prior criminal record.
Additionally, the concept of due process, the right to present a defense,
and the protection against infliction of arbitrary, severe punishment guar-
anteed by the fifth, sixth and eighth amendments logically embrace the
right of the capital defendant to make a personal plea for his life. Assuming
that the sentencing decision rests on the persuasiveness with which the
defendant makes his plea, compromising his right to speak with the threat
of impeachment with his prior criminal record may serve to deprive him
of the best, or only, defense against the death penalty.
The New Mexico capital sentencing scheme provides that the jury not
only weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances in setting punish-
ment, but that it also consider the "defendant and the crime" in its
deliberations.' 23 Clearly, the evidence at trial will fully set forth the cir-
cumstances of the offense for the jury's review. In fact, the court instructs
the jury to consider all the evidence admitted at the trial in making its
punishment decision. "24
The instruction relating to consideration of the "defendant" is suffi-
ciently broad to permit the jury to consider both the facts adduced as
121. N.M. Const. art. II, §4.
122. The right to defend against deprivation of life or liberty by legal means is also expressly
encompassed by the guarantees of N.M. Const. art. II, § 14. Similarly, the right to defend life or
liberty physically is implied by the language of N.M. Const. art. II, § 6, which guarantees the fight
of New Mexicans to keep and bear firearms for personal use.
123. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20A-1(C)(Repl. Pamp. 1981); N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 39.34 (Cum. Supp.
1984).
124. N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-20A-1(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1981); N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 39.12, 39.32,
39.33 (Cum. Supp. 1984). The amended jury instructions adopted by the supreme court, effective
October 1, 1984, now instruct the jury to consider trial evidence in the punishment phase only in
N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 39.12.
Winter 19851
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
evidence of mitigating circumstances, 25 and non-mitigating facts. 126 Con-
sideration of the "defendant and the crime," however, does not permit
the jury, while engaging in the weighing process, to consider factors not
set out in the statute as aggravating circumstances. 27 Thus, the instruction
expands the jury's consideration of factors favorable to the accused'28
while restricting the jury's examination of unfavorable factors. The plea
for mercy or personal statement is the type of factor the Uniform Jury
Instructions embrace and upon which the jury might rest a decision to
impose a life sentence, rather than death.
V. IMPEACHMENT OF A PLEADING DEFENDANT
WITH PRIOR CONVICTIONS
The federal'29 and state constitutions 3' impliedly guarantee the ac-
cused's right to testify. The potential for impeachment with prior
convictions"' or bad acts under Rule 608(b) of the New Mexico Rules
of Evidence'32 often compromises the exercise of this right. 33 While
125. N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 39.33 (Cum. Supp. 1984) instructs the jury to consider any mitigating
circumstances demonstrated by the evidence, which are not limited to the statutory mitigating
circumstances set forth in N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20A-6 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
126. A "non-mitigating fact" demonstrated at trial might involve the conduct or personality of
the accused displayed in the commission of the offense, such as a display of sadism or depravity.
127. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20A-5 (Repl. Pamp. 1981). Contra Ga. Code Ann. § 17-10-30(1982);
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.012(3) (Supp. 1982) (expressly authorizing jury to consider non-statutory
aggravating circumstances).
128. N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 39.30 (Repl. Pamp. 1982) instructed the jury to consider, in addition to
the statutory mitigating and non-statutory mitigating circumstances, the "character, emotional history
and family history of the defendant." The amended instruction, N.M. U.J.1. Crim. 39.33 (Cum.
Supp. 1984), provides that these elements of mitigation are only to be included in the instruction if
raised by the evidence and requested by the defense. See id. Use Notes 2 and 3. This instruction
comports with the United States Supreme Court decision in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104
(1982).
129. U.S. Const. amends. V, VI.
130. N.M. Const. art. II, § 14.
131. Juries are, for example, more likely to convict a defendant who has a prior criminal record.
See H. Kalven & H. Ziesel, The American Jury 146, 160-69 (1966).
132. Of course under Rule 608(b), the impeachment evidence is limited by rule to those acts
deemed probative of untruthfulness. However, New Mexico courts have tended to view "untruth-
fulness" broadly, equating that concept with "dishonesty," as provided in Rule 609(a)(2). See State
v. Miller, 92 N.M. 520, 590 P.2d 1175 (Ct. App. 1979); State v. Melendrez, 91 N.M. 259, 572
P.2d 1267 (Ct. App. 1977). In Miller, the court held that acts of dishonesty were proper subjects
for impeachment under Rule 608(b) as probative of untruthfulness. 92 N.M. at 522, 590 P.2d at
1117. But see Rhodes v. State, 267 Ark. 278, -, 634 S.W.2d 107, 110 (1982) (court held that
state's witness in a capital murder prosecution could not be cross-examined on his prior acts of
shoplifting). The Rhodes court read Arkansas Evidence Rule 608(b) "to limit the inquiry on cross-
examination to specific instances of misconduct clearly probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness
as distinguished from conduct probative of dishonesty."
The New Mexico Supreme Court may well have expanded the basis for Rule 608(b) impeachment
in State v. Worley, 100 N.M. 720, 676 P.2d 247 (1984). See infra note 151.
133. See, e.g., Albrecht v. State, 486 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). Interestingly, however,
the Texas death penalty statute appears to authorize a sentence of death based on the accused's
history of generally being a criminal. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. § 37.071 (Vernon 1965).
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impeachment with either may have legitimate value, this evidence never-
theless may improperly serve to suggest that the accused is generally a
criminal which is not a proper reason for imposing the death sentence
under the New Mexico statute. Once admitted for purposes of impeach-
ment, evidence of prior convictions or bad acts may well jeopardize a
defendant whose mitigating evidence is already weak. It may also serve
to undermine an otherwise strong punishment defense significantly.
The failure to testify itself may result in a negative reaction from the
jury. Expression of personal regret, tone of voice, and ability to develop
a personal response within individual jurors may prove important factors
in the jury's eventual decision concerning the punishment it will impose.
Exercise of the right to remain silent, an important decision in terms of
trial and appellate strategy, may prove correct in terms of avoiding neg-
ative evidence"34 or waiver of error.'35 It also may have the result of
insulating the jury from the accused and isolating its sentencing decision
from the fact that the death sentence, if imposed, will actually result in
execution of a fellow human being.
The justification for barring the state from impeaching the allocuting
or pleading capital defendant with his prior record of conviction lies in
the distinction between the accused giving testimony in his own behalf
and the accused making a plea for mercy. In the first instance, the tes-
timony is offered either to dispute a fact in issue at trial or to offer evidence
of another fact which the accused advances defensively. For example,
the accused may offer an alibi defense and deny commission of the
offense, or may offer evidence that he was present but insane at the time
of the offense. These types of facts are subject to rebuttal and form the
basis for disputed issues which the trier of fact must resolve and, therefore,
justify impeachment.
In contrast, the accused making a plea for mercy does not intend to
advance or to dispute facts, but instead uses the plea to ask for lenience
or understanding in the sentencer's decision. If the accused does not stray
from this subject matter in his statement, the plea made does not justify
traditional impeachment.
Generally, a criminal defendant choosing to testify in his own behalf
is treated as any other witness with respect to the right of the prosecution
134. For example, once an accused takes the stand, he may be impeached by prior statements
made against his penal interest, even including confessions which might otherwise be inadmissible.
See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
135. Error may be waived when the accused testifies and admits facts which should otherwise
have been excluded from the jury's consideration. For instance, once an accused testifies he opens
the door to general attack on his credibility as a witness. State v. Guess, 98 N.M. 438, 440, 649
P.2d 506, 508 (Ct. App. 1982). The opinion or reputation testimony of other witnesses as to this
particular character trait of the accused would otherwise be inadmissible; upon taking the stand any
error in admitting this testimony from other witnesses would be waived.
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to cross-examine and impeach through use of extrinsic evidence.' 36 The
prosecutor may use the prior record of the defendant's convictions to
impeach the defendant's testimony, for instance. 3 7 Rule 609(a) of the
New Mexico Rules of Evidence permits the use of prior convictions as
impeachment under the following terms:
General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if
elicited from him or established by public record during cross-ex-
amination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or im-
prisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was
convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of ad-
mitting the evidence outweighs the prejudicial effort to the defendant,
or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the pun-
ishment. 3
The rule requires the trial judge to weigh the probative value of the
evidence against its prejudicial effect in determining whether to admit
the prior conviction.' 39 In practical terms, an appellate court will not
disturb the decision to permit the use of valid prior convictions for im-
peachment, even if the record does not demonstrate affirmatively that
136. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980); State v. Guess, 98 N.M. 438, 649 P.2d 506
(Ct. App. 1982); State v. Lindsey, 81 N.M. 173, 414 P.2d 903 (Ct. App. 1969), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 904 (1970); N.M. R. Evid. 609.
137. In viewing the testifying defendant, the New Mexico Court of Appeals has urged a judicious
evaluation of use of prior acts of misconduct before permitting use of these acts as impeachment
evidence:
Where the witness is the defendant . . . [tlhe trial court ... should limit the
cross examination where its legitimate probative value on the credibility of the
accused as a witness seems obviously outweighed by its illegitimate tendency,
effect and often purpose, to prejudice him as a defendant.
State v. McFerran, 80 N.M. 622, 626, 459 P.2d 148, 152 (Ct. App. 1969) (citing State v. Holden,
45 N.M. 147, 160, 113 P.2d 171, 179 (1941)). But see State v. Worley, 100 N.M. 720, 723, 676
P.2d 247, 250 (1984) (court held that impeachment of a witness based on prior commission of
criminal sexual contact was proper, reasoning that prior commission of a similar offense would
reflect on the credibility of a witness testifying for an accused charged with a sex offense).
138. N.M. R. Evid. 609.
139. See generally State v. Coca, 80 N.M. 95, 451 P.2d 999 (Ct. App. 1969) (suggesting that
the record must demonstrate that the trial judge did, in fact, engage in the weighing process before
admitting the evidence); accord State v. Jones, 101 Wash. 2d 113, 677 P.2d 131 (1984):
Without a statement of reasons demonstrating that the trial court did engage in
a balancing analysis it is impossible for an appellate court to evaluate the trial
court's decision. Therefore, what was suggested in Thompson [95 Wash. 2d
393, 632 P.2d 50 (1981)], we now make mandatory: that is, a trial court must
state, for the record, the factors which favor admission' or exclusion of prior
conviction evidence.
Id. at -. , 677 P.2d at 137. The weighing of probative value against prejudice follows the general
rule set out in N.M. R. Evid. 403, which provides that any evidence may be excluded where its
prejudicial impact outweighs its probative value, where it may result in confusion or misdirection
of the jury, or where it may result in undue delay in the proceedings.
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such a weighing process actually took place.140 New Mexico law limits
the extent of an impeachment inquiry to the fact of the prior conviction
and the name of the offense.' The law limits the relevant scope of the
evidence to the actual judgment of conviction, rather than to underlying
facts of the offenses which might be highly relevant in many instances. '42
Thus, a trial court generally may not admit the facts surrounding com-
mission of a particularly brutal murder, even though it may permit the
state to prove that the witness had been convicted of the murder. These
facts may be admissible, of course, under the framework of New Mexico
Rule of Evidence 404(b), which authorizes use of evidence from other
offenses of similar character to establish elements or circumstances tend-
ing to show the defendant's guilt in a subsequent prosecution."'
Rule 609(b) sets a second limitation on the use of prior convictions
for impeachment purposes.'" This provision recognizes a bar on use of
140. State v. Sibold, 83 N.M. 678, 496 P.2d 738 (Ct. App. 1972) (trial court's exercise of
discretion not disturbed on appeal unless judge's action can be characterized as erroneous, arbitrary,
and unwarranted); State v. Williams, 76 N.M. 578, 417 P.2d 62 (1966).
141. See State v. Coca, 80 N.M. 95, 97, 451 P.2d 999, 1001 (Ct. App. 1969) (citing New Mexico
authorities); State v. Ocanas, 61 N.M. 484, 303 P.2d 390 (1956).
142. For instance, an accused's prior record might reveal factually similar offenses tending to
suggest a propensity to commit crimes in a recognizable fashion. Unless admissible under evidence
Rule 404(b), the facts of these prior offenses would likely prove so inherently prejudicial as to
preclude a fair trial. The Washington court in State v. Jones, 101 Wash. 2d 113, 677 P.2d 131
(1984), observed: "It is difficult for the jury to erase the notion that a person who has once committed
a crime is more likely to do so again. The prejudice is even greater when the prior conviction is
similar to the crime for which the defendant is being tried." Id. at __, 677 P.2d at 136 (citing State
v. Pam, 98 Wash. 2d 748, 760, 659 P.2d 454, 460 (1983) (Utter, J., concurring)).
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals observed in Railton v. United States, 127 F.2d 691
(5th Cir. 1942):
It is logical to conclude, and very apt to be concluded, that because a man was
dishonest once he will steal again. It is certainly 'more probable' that a crooked
official did steal than if he were an upright one. Yet our law forbids these very
premises. It cannot be shown that the accused has committed other similar
crimes to show that it is probable he committed the one charged.
Id. at 693.
Of course, this type of reasoning is the basis for a significant aspect of the Texas death penalty
scheme-the special issue focusing on the probability that the accused would commit acts of criminal
violence in the future. See supra notes 44, 51-56 and accompanying text.
143. Generally, N.M. R. Evid. 404(b) permits the proponent of evidence showing commission
of extraneous offenses to offer such evidence to prove an element of its case where the element can
only be shown inferentially. The evidence is relevant if the two offenses are sufficiently similar in
pertinent characteristics to permit a reasonable inference to be drawn with respect to the motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of motive or mistake on the
part of the actor. State v. Marquez, 87 N.M. 56, 529 P.2d 283 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 87 N.M.
47, 529 P.2d 273 (1974); State v. Lopez, 85 N.M. 742, 516 P.2d 1125 (Ct. App. 1973).
144. N.M. R. Evid. 609(b). This provision sets ten years as an arbitrary limitation based on the
notion that the older the conviction, the less probative it is of the testifying defendant's or other
witness' credibility. United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 867
(1977). If time is the critical factor in the analysis underlying Rule 609(b), it would appear that the
date of offense-rather than conviction or last date of incarceration-should be the logical starting
point for computation of the ten year period.
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convictions older than ten years from the date that the accused was
discharged from custody, or from the date of conviction if he was not
incarcerated, in a subsequent proceeding.
The rationale behind Rule 609 appears to be that evidence of prior
criminal conduct resulting in conviction at the felony level inherently
suggests the probable dishonesty of the accused in testifying. '45 Certainly,
in light of the potential application of enhanced punishment,'46 the tes-
tifying accused has a motivation for avoiding conviction, even at the
expense of committing perjury.'47 The rule, however, does not advance
this rationale for holding priors admissible as a basis for impeachment;
it merely distinguishes between felonies and other crimes which involve
dishonesty or fraud.'48 Thus, the rule limits use of non-felony convictions
for impeachment to the latter category of offenses,'4 9 which bear some
relationship to the espoused justification for impeachment. '50 Absent this
distinction at the felony level, it appears that the true theory for impeach-
ment with a prior record lies in the fact that the conviction makes a
statement about the character of the witness.'' As the New Hampshire
court candidly observed in State v. Duke: 2 "No sufficient reason appears
why the jury should not be informed what sort of person is asking them
to take his word. In transactions of everyday life this is probably the first
thing they would wish to know.""' The Duke court might well have been
correct in its conclusion. The logic of this justification for admission of
prior convictions, however, breaks down at the point where the jury relies
on past criminality, rather than the evidence adduced at trial, as its basis
for conviction. "'
145. See J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 609[02]-[04] (1982).
146. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-17 (Cum. Supp. 1984) provides for habitual offender penalties of
one, four, or eight years based on one, two, or three or more prior felony convictions, respectively.
Moreover, the enhanced punishment may be applied to each count upon which conviction is obtained
and these sentences may be ordered served consecutively. State v. Harris, 101 N.M. 12, 20-21, 677
P.2d 625, 633-34 (Ct. App. 1984).
147. The penalty for perjury as set by N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-25-1 (1978) is 18 months, the
statutory punishment for a fourth degree felony.
148. N.M. R. Evid. 609(a)(1) permits impeachment with any felony, subject to the trial court's
exercise of discretion.
149. N.M. R. Evid. 609(a)(2).
150. The misdemeanor provision looks directly to whether the prior conviction could be said to
reflect conduct truly evidencing a tendency toward dishonesty or mendacity.
151. See State v. Worley, 100 N.M. 720, 676 P.2d 247 (1984). In Worley, the court held that the
witness' prior commission of the offense of criminal sexual penetration was admissible to impeach
his testimony in defendant's rape-murder trial, imputing to the witness a motive to lie based on his
own history of similar criminal behavior.
152. 100 N.H. 292, 123 A.2d 745 (1956).
153. Id. at , 123 A.2d at 746.
154. In Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450 (1892), Mr. Justice Harlan observed the dangers
inherent in admission of prior offenses in a criminal prosecution:
Those robberies may have been committed by the defendants in March, and
yet they may have been innocent of the murder of Dansby in April. Proof of
them only tended to prejudice the defendants with the jurors, to draw their
minds away from the real issue, and to produce the impression that they were
wretches whose lives were of no value to the community, and who were not
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As long as the testifying defendant in a capital prosecution is asserting
facts in issue in either the guilt/innocence or punishment stages of trial, 155
the theoretical foundation of Rule 609(a) may well remain valid--even
though it is difficult to understand why the arbitrary ten-year limitation
imposed by Rule 609(b) is justified, because such a bar will have little
relationship to the reliability of the testimony or the witness.'56 However,
in the event the defendant merely seeks to make a statement or a plea
requesting the jury's mercy or consideration in setting punishment, the
justification for permitting impeachment with prior convictions is alto-
gether inapplicable.' 57
Because the plea for mercy or personal statement constitutes nothing
more than the defendant's declaration of his interest in remaining alive
or avoiding the death penalty, the plea does not warrant impeachment.
Thus, use of prior convictions to "impeach" the statement would simply
afford the state another argument for imposition of the death penalty. 5 '
The New Mexico statute expressly disapproves of this use of a "non-
statutory aggravating circumstance. "5 9 The prohibition on the use of such
entitled to the full benefit of the rules prescribed by law for the trial of human
beings charged with crime involving the punishment of death.
Id. at 458. See also State v. Rowell, 77 N.M. 124, 419 P.2d 966 (1966). Of course, once the accused
testifies, Rule 609(a) permits the introduction of these same priors, if probative of credibility in the
judgment of the trial court, to be admitted for impeachment purposes.
155. While testifying regarding matters pertinent to guilt or innocence or, during the capital
punishment phase, to whether the murder was committed under the aggravating circumstances
charged, the accused would stand in the shoes of any other witness. See generally State v. Duran,
83 N.M. 700, 496 P.2d 1096 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 83 N.M. 699, 496 P.2d 1095 (1972).
156. The ten year limitation is not applicable to use of impeachment evidence under Rule 608(b)
where the prior bad acts are probative of truthfulness. The rules provide no explanation for disparity
of treatment given impeachment evidence offered under Rule 609(a)(2)-as controlled by Rule
609(b)--and that admissible under 608(b). Arguably, the 10-year limitation of 609(b) could be
circumvented by a prosecutor's inquiry concerning the "acts," but not the conviction, showing a
tendency for untruthfulness if the conviction itself would otherwise be barred by the rule. Cf. State
v. Wyman, 96 N.M. 558, 632 P.2d 1196 (Ct. App. 1981)(acts underlying juvenile adjudications may
be admissible under Rule 608(b), even though adjudications are generally not admissible to impeach
under Rule 609(c)).
157. N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 40.22 (Repl. Pamp. 1982) limits the jury's consideration of prior con-
victions and bad acts "for the purpose of determining whether the defendant told the truth when he
testified . . . and for that purpose only."
158. The "argument" would be that the cumulative criminality of the accused justifies a sentence
of death which otherwise would not be imposed based on the jury's consideration of the defendant
and the crime.
159. N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-20A-5 (Repl. Pamp. 1981); N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 39.34 (Cum. Supp.
1984). In rejecting an attack on N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 39.33 (Repl. Pamp. 1982), the predecessor of
39.34 then in effect, the supreme court in State v. Guzman, 100 N.M. 756, 676 P.2d 1321, cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 3548 (1984) stated:
Guzman asserts that the language of UJI Crim. 39.33, in effect, allows non-
statutory aggravating circumstances to be considered, and that it is therefore
unconstitutional. We hold that UJI Crim. 39.33 does not allow the consideration
of non-statutory aggravating circumstances. UJI Crim. 39.33 relates to the
weighing process, not to the threshold determination of whether an aggravating
circumstance exists.
We have previously held that UJI Crim. 39.33 does not allow the death penalty
to be imposed in an arbitrary manner which is not rationally reviewa-
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circumstances and the legislature's decision not to include a defendant's
prior record as a statutory aggravating circumstance 6 ° are inconsistent
with the use of the record to "impeach" testimony 6' offered merely in
mitigation and without particular reference to any factual issue raised in
the trial of the case.
In order to afford the accused an opportunity to gain whatever advantage
direct communication with the jury may have, it is important that the
supreme court recognize, and that the trial courts respect, a defendant's
right to address the jury without threat of compromise by impeachment
with prior convictions. If the defendant merely seeks to ask for continued
life by making the statement, or to plead for mercy, little justification, if
any, exists for permitting the state to then develop a record of prior
criminal conduct which may have little bearing on whether death is an
appropriate punishment for the offense that the defendant committed.' 62
Use of the prior record, or of evidence of bad acts not resulting in
conviction, to "impeach" in this instance may well result in a jury verdict
that is based more on punishment for a cumulation of criminality than
for the capital crime upon which the state has obtained a conviction. This
type of punishment decision clearly violates the legislative intent under-
lying the New Mexico statute, given the legislative decision not to au-
thorize as an aggravating circumstance a prior or substantial record of
criminal activity on the part of the accused.
The right of allocution which the court recognized in Tomlinson'63 is
the right to make a statement in mitigation of punishment, not merely
ble .... There is no indication that the jury is to consider non-statutory ag-
gravating circumstances. Therefore, we again find no fault with UJI Crim.
39.33.
100 N.M. at 760, 676 P.2d at 1325 (citations omitted).
160. Id. See Miller v. State, 373 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1979). In Miller, the Florida Supreme Court
reversed a death sentence based on the trial court's consideration of evidence concerning the "future
dangerousness" of the defendant. "Future dangerousness" was not an aggravating circumstance
under the Florida statute, which expressly limits sentencing determinations to statutorily recognized
aggravating circumstances. Id. at 885. See also Wainwright v. Goode, 104 S. Ct. 378, 381 n.3
(1983). In Wainwright, the court held that federal courts must defer to the Florida Supreme Court's
determination that a death sentence was not based on the trial court's improper consideration of a
non-statutory aggravating circumstance. Id. at 382 (following Goode v. State, 365 So. 2d 381 (Fla.
1978).
161. N.M. R. Evid. 609. See United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 867 (1977).
162. "Appropriateness" of punishment is a concept that has, in one sense, assumed a constitutional
dimension not previously articulated in reviews of sentencing procedures. Once an accused has been
sentenced to life imprisonment by either jury or judge following an adversarial proceeding that
resembles, in significant aspects, a "trial," the sentencing decision assumes the dimension of an
"acquittal" on the issue of whether the death sentence is appropriate. Arizona v. Rumsey, 104 S.
Ct. 2305, 2310 (1984) (following Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 437-41 (1980)). Cf. United
States v. Difrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980). See also State v. Bullington, 594 S.W.2d 908, 922
(Mo. 1980)(Borgett, C.J., dissenting) (observing that an initial imposition of a life sentence by the
jury at defendant's first trial meant that "the jury has already acquitted the defendant of whatever
was necessary to impose the death sentence" (emphasis added)).
163. 98 N.M. 213, 647 P.2d 415 (1982).
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the right to present evidence subject to cross-examination during the
punishment hearing."4 A meaningful application of this right in capital
sentencing proceedings requires that the accused be permitted to make
the statement or plea directly to the jury without threat that evidence of
a highly prejudicial and factually irrelevant nature will follow. Of course,
if the statement requires rebuttal because the accused misrepresents his
prior record or lifestyle, the state should be allowed to rebut the misre-
presentation on cross-examination or by extrinsic proof of prior convic-
tions. 65 Otherwise, the accused should make the statement as a plea in
allocution, not subject to further examination, leaving the jury free to
examine the the plea on its merits.
Reference to usual trial procedures and safeguards for the rights of the
accused may minimize the significance of imposing the death penalty. "
The traditional right of the defendant to make his statement in allocution
should not be denied or limited because the sentencing authority might
be a jury, rather than a trial judge. '67 Formal recognition of the right of
unimpaired allocution will serve the interests of society in reaching correct
sentencing decisions in capital cases. Unimpaired allocution will insure
that the capital defendant's address to the jury will not be compromised
by a prior record of criminal conduct.
VI. CONCLUSION
The right of allocution, recognized in New Mexico, and the consti-
tutional right to present mitigation evidence in capital sentencing pro-
ceedings suggest the appropriateness of the right of a capital defendant
to make a personal statement or plea for mercy to his jury. Until formal
recognition of the right is secured and some standard procedure for en-
suring the right is developed, counsel should be aware of the potential
for obtaining a ruling on the state's use of a prior criminal record to
impeach a pleading defendant.
164. In Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2070-71 (1984), the Court rejected an
ineffective assistance claim based on trial counsel's failure to put on evidence at the sentencing
hearing in a death penalty trial. The defendant did engage in a "plea colloquy" with the trial judge,
essentially making a personal plea for mercy to the court. In rejecting the attack on counsel's
performance, the Court concluded that the plea colloquy was a strategically acceptable alternative
to calling other witnesses, whose favorable testimony for the accused would be subject to impeach-
ment.
165. The defendant's right to give testimony in his own behalf is generally provided by N.M.
Const. art. II, § 14. By interjecting an issue of fact into the proceedings, the defendant would likely
forfeit any protection afforded by the doctrine of allocution. As Chief Justice Burger noted in Harris
v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), "Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own
defense, or to refuse to do so. But that privilege cannot be construed to include the right to commit
perjury." Id. at 225. See also State v. Maynard, 311 N.C. 1, 316 S.E. 2d 197 (1984).
166. See Radin, supra note 10.
167. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20A-I(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1982) provides that in a non-jury sentencing
proceeding "the judge shall allow argument and determine the punishment to be imposed." This
section would appear to provide sufficient flexibility to permit the accused to make a plea for mercy
to the trial judge.
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Rules 608168 and 609169 of the New Mexico Rules of Evidence both
follow the weighing process of Rule 403170 in directing the trial court to
determine whether the prejudice to the accused from introduction of
evidence of prior convictions or bad acts outweighs the probative value
of the evidence. Counsel should prepare and file prior to trial a motion
in limine setting forth the defendant's desire to make a statement to the
jury without threat of impeachment with his prior record or conduct and
request a ruling on this motion."'7 If denied, counsel should then preserve
the error by tendering the testimony of the defendant that: (1) he desires
to make a statement or plea for mercy to the jury; (2) he is aware of a
prior record of convictions or bad acts which might be admissible to
impeach his testimony; (3) the threat of prejudice to his jury from dis-
closure of the prior record is coercing him into foregoing his right to
testify, which the United States and New Mexico constitutions protect;
and (4) that the potential for jury prejudice which would result if the
prior record is disclosed to impeach his statement compromises his right
of allocution. '72
In the event the trial court grants the motion in limine, counsel must
carefully prepare his witness so as to avoid any misrepresentation con-
cerning the character of the defendant and his propensity for lawfulness.
Otherwise, the defendant may forfeit any advantage gained with the
motion in limine by opening up his prior record of convictions or bad
168. N.M. R. Evid. 608.
169. N.M. R. Evid. 609 (except as to convictions for offenses involving dishonesty or false
statement). In contrast, the Arizona Rule requires the court to engage in the probative value/prejudice
weighing process even when the prior convictions involve dishonesty or false statement. State v.
Dixon, 126 Ariz. 617, 617 P.2d 779 (1980).
170. N.M. R. Evid. 403.
171. The Vermont Supreme Court, in State v. Ritchie, 144 Vt. 121, 473 A.2d 1164 (1984),
reversed the trial court's refusal to rule, prior to jury selection, on defendant's motion to exclude
evidence of his prior convictions. Counsel urged in his motion that a pretrial ruling was necessary
in order for him to determine the approach to be taken in his opening statement, whether or not to
voir dire the panel on defendant's priors, and how to counsel defendant on whether to testify in his
own behalf. Id. See United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985 (2nd Cir. 1980); State v. Cook, 106
Idaho 209, 677 P.2d 522 (Ct. App. 1984).
But see State v. Allen, 91 N.M. 759, 581 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1978). In Allen, the New Mexico
Court of Appeals rejected defendant's claim that the trial court erred in not making a pre-trial ruling
on admissibility of prior convictions for impeachment purposes. Id. at 761, 581 P.2d at 24.
172. See State v. Foye, 100 N.M. 385, 671 P.2d 46 (Ct. App. 1983). In Foye, the court of appeals
recognized that a constitutional argument for severance may be predicated on the accused's desire
to both testify as to allegations in some counts of a multi-count charging instrument while remaining
silent on others. The court suggested a procedural predicate for preserving the issue on appeal which
is adopted to the issue discussed in this Article. Id. at 388, 671 P.2d at 49. See also United States
v. Hendershot, 614 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1980) (accused preserved issue on improper use of prior
convictions as chilling right to testify by outlining on witness stand his proposed testimony which
would have been offered before the jury but for the prospect of impeachment with prior record).
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acts for true impeachment. '73 As in preparation of the testifying defendant
for cross-examination, counsel must focus on those factors which may
enhance the persuasive impact of his client's statement upon the jurors,
particularly with regard to his expressions of sincerity and of personal
belief in his own self-worth and in his plea for leniency.
Finally, the New Mexico Supreme Court should affirmatively recognize
the use of the personal statement as a right of the capital defendant. Early
recognition of the right by decision or through adoption of an appropriate
jury instruction may avoid execution of a citizen who lacked the oppor-
tunity to speak to his jury regarding his interest in continued life and his
belief that his life may be worth saving in spite of the damaging evidence
presented at trial concerning his participation in a capital crime.' 74 Cer-
tainly, forcing the accused to make an intelligent decision whether to
address the jury, based on the prospect of impeachment with his prior
record, assumes greater gravity when the potential punishment is death.
Due process requires that the defendant be freed from the normal operation
of rules involving trial and appellate strategy so that he may plead for
mercy or leniency because the consequence of his plea may be the im-
position of a life sentence instead of punishment by death.
173. For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has observed in considering challenges to
the use of priors under Rule 609(a): "Normally the court should err on the side of excluding a
challenged prior conviction, with a warning to the defendant that any misrepresentation of his
background on the stand will lead to admission of the conviction for impeachment purposes." United
States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1034 (1980).
Cf. United States v. Erb, 596 F.2d 412 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 848 (1979)
(defendant's testimony opened door to evidence of similar acts previously ruled inadmissible by trial
court in government's case in chief).
174. N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 39.12 (Cum. Supp. 1984) instructs the jury to "consider all evidence
from the trial in which the defendant was found guilty of murder" in assessing punishment. See
also N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 39.33 (Repl. Pamp. 1982)(former formulation of this instruction).
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